M ultimedia applications managing protected content in heterogeneous environments have increased considerably in recent years. Nowadays, consumers and multimedia system users wish to access any kind of content from any device they have available. However, in most cases, resources aren't available to all system users, so that the multimedia platform then has to control user access and resource usage and management. On the other hand, if authorized users consume content in heterogeneous usage environments, the content needs to be adapted for enhancing the users' perceived quality. Therefore, platforms managing digital content need to provide functionalities for user authentication, content protection and governance, data integrity and authenticity, content adaptation, content consumption, and notification of events in an integrated fashion.
With this in mind, we analyze existing initiatives and propose new technologies for the governed adaptations of secured content in heterogeneous environments. We integrate these technologies into an architecture for the secure management of multimedia content, covering the complete digital content value chain, from creation to consumption.
Adapting secured content
Current digital rights management (DRM) initiatives specify how digital assets can be managed in a controlled way throughout the complete digital value chain. Among the different content-life-cycle stages, these initiatives focus on content distribution and consumption. The existing DRM systems enable the distribution and consumption of protected digital assets according to the terms stated by their distributors and rights holders. 1 Digital assets are governed by means of licenses expressed according to a Rights Expression Language (REL), while licenses containing rights and obligations are in turn enforced by license-based authorization tools. Despite the significant research work conducted on content adaptation to date, 2 not many of the current DRM initiatives consider the secure adaptation of digital assets as one of their requirements. A few of those initiatives enable the adaptation of protected content, but not the necessary finegrained governance of digital assets. By definition, governance embodies the enforcement of rights expressions, which restrict content adaptations according to the terms stated by content creators and rights holders.
Adaptation authorization
As the development of the two aforementioned areas of research has been pursued separately, it seems impossible to govern content adaptations because of their lack of fine-grained descriptions about permissible conversions nowadays. Only recently the two groups of researchers working on adaptation and DRM started to cooperate in jointly defining approaches and methodologies to combine each other's outcomes into a single framework. 3 
Feature Article
This article analyzes existing initiatives and proposes new technologies for the governed adaptations of secured content in heterogeneous environments. These technologies are integrated into an architecture for the secure management of multimedia content.
The MPEG-21 Digital Item Adaptation (DIA) provides-among other features-the description of fine-grained media conversions by means of the conversion operations' names and parameters, which can be used to define rights expressions to govern adaptation in an interoperable way. Meanwhile, the MPEG-21 REL data model for a rights expression includes four basic entities (principal, right, resource, and condition). To follow this model, the MPEG-21 DIA conversion permissions must be integrated within the condition element.
Many of the research projects that have been working with MPEG-21 DIA (for example, Daidalos, aceMEDIA, and so on) have earmarked this point as possible future work. We've been involved in other projects such as Axmedis, the Visnet II network of excellence, and the second part of Projecte Integrat (named project Machine), which have also begun to conduct research work in this area. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we've developed the first real implementation of this new adaptation authorization concept. 4 
Content protection for adaptation
Context-aware content adaptation is one of the powerful tools to enhance the perceived quality of the multimedia content consumed in heterogeneous usage environments. To perform content-adaptation operations, certain information embedded in the compressed bitstreams has to be available to intermediate nodes of a delivery chain. However, classic video encryption technologies presume no third-party access to any information in the encoded video is necessary. Consequently, intermediate nodes have to decrypt the content before performing any adaptation operation. Decrypting at an intermediate node, however, isn't allowed in an end-to-end content-protection environment. A number of researchers have attempted to address this issue. 5, 6 Our work, as with most of the recent literature, focuses on encrypting H.264/Advanced Video Coding (H.264/AVC) and the scalability extension of H.264/Scalability Video Coding (H.264/SVC)-compatible bitstreams. H.264 organizes encoded data into network abstraction layer (NAL) units, each of which is encapsulated into a data packet and is independently decodable. This feature improves the ability of adapting the encoded video data in a network-friendly way. Hence, most of the encryption schemes proposed for H.264 independently treat each NAL unit. A number of H.264/AVC-compatible partial ciphering techniques have been proposed by various researchers. [7] [8] [9] These techniques encrypt a set of selected syntax elements without disturbing the integrity of the bitstream. As a result, the bitstream can be parsed and subsequently decoded without decrypting the encrypted syntax elements even though the visual quality of the decoded video is greatly compromised. Hence, this type of encryption is suitable when total confidentiality isn't essential. 10 Moreover, these techniques don't consider adaptability because they don't address encrypting scalable video content. In contrast, other techniques [11] [12] [13] attempt to implement comprehensive security, while retaining the in-network adaptability (we use the techniques of Arachchi et al. 12 throughout this article).
Naturally, these techniques encrypt the payloads of each NAL unit, while keeping the header information plain so that any innetwork adaptation node can treat the NAL units as if they aren't encrypted. To maintain the independence of each encrypted NAL unit, a unique initialization vector (IV) is determined for each NAL unit. Going against this norm, the video-encryption architecture discussed in other work 14 derives the IV from a previously encrypted NAL unit. In this way, a dependency is created between encrypted NAL units. The IV generation technique is designed in such a way that the encryption dependencies match with the encoding dependencies among the scalability layers. 
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Proposed architecture Figure 1 presents the functional architecture of our proposed platform. The platform is a complete DRM system that permits the adaptation of secure content. We based our approach on the Multimedia Information Protection and Management System (Mipams) architecture. 16 Mipams was devised for the management of multimedia information, taking into account DRM and protection. Specifically, the aim of this DRM architecture is to enable the management of multimedia content through the complete content value chain, from content creation to consumption by end users, including adaptation of digital content. A detailed comparison study of Mipams with other DRM architectures can be found elsewhere. 17 The governance server provides functionalities for the creation and storage of licenses and online license-based authorization; it's responsible for authorizing users to perform actions over resources. When a user tries to perform an action over a resource, this module checks if a license has been issued to the user to perform the requested operation. Furthermore, the module integrates adaptation-authorization functionalities that permit governing complex content-adaptation operations through the use of detailed descriptions of the permitted conversions expressed in MPEG-21 DIA.
The content server lets users and applications create, edit, upload, browse, and search digital resources. Those resources can be protected. Next, protection keys are sent to the protection server, which sends an encrypted version of the key to the content server; those keys are registered through the protection server.
The protection server protects digital content, digital objects, or metadata, mainly using encryption techniques and scrambling. The actual data to be protected, either audiovisual media content or metadata, is converted to an unintelligible form by means of a scrambling transformation, using a secret key as an input parameter. The values of the scrambling keys aren't stored directly in the protection server. Instead, an encrypted version of these keys is stored, using an appropriate protection key. The protection keys, and not the scrambling keys, are associated with the corresponding licenses. Both the scrambling of content and the protection of the scrambling keys are achieved with cryptographic algorithms. The term scrambling is simply used to distinguish the encryption of content from the encryption of keys, for analogy with the traditional use of this term for protected audiovisual-mediacontent transmissions.
The adaptation engine is the primary contentadaptation module in the proposed architecture. It comprises two main building blocks for performing its adaptation task, namely the adaptation-decision-taking block and the actual content-adapting block. The adaptation-decision block is responsible for taking into account all of the usage-environment constraints as well as users' preferences through means of various context elements in an adaptation system. It subsequently processes these restraints and preferences and decides what type of a contentadaptation tool to employ to best serve them. The decision information is then passed to the actual content-adapting block, whose task is to execute the necessary tools and operations, as dictated by the taken adaptation decisions. Certainly, both of these tasks are undertaken in line with the necessary authorizations provided by the governance server, which also acts as the adaptation authorizer for operating the overall system.
The proposed architecture is capable of supporting both trusted and untrusted types of adaptation engines. As the name implies, a trusted adaptation engine is one that can make use of the security keys provided to it 
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for decrypting secured content so as to perform a number of both structural and signal-level content-adaptation operations. With a similar analogy, an untrusted adaptation engine is a content-adapting engine with which a security key can't be shared, and thus the contentadaptation operation should be performed on the media stream blindly (that is to say, without decrypting the content). 12 The supervision server provides a number of functionalities, ranging from the authentication and supervision of actors and system components to the receipt and storage of the event reports, regarding content consumption or other relevant issues in the system.
The registration server is an equally significant module in this architecture, as it's responsible for supplying the necessary certificates to the various actors and components involved in the system to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.
The intermediary module acts as the interface between the user (the trusted client in Figure 1 ) and the main platform modules. Thus, the user registers, gets authenticated, and selects to access certain content through this particular module. Furthermore, the intermediary is responsible for detecting context updates, and consequently requesting the necessary adaptations, authorizations, and so on, to apply to the content.
Finally, the content server stores not only the content, but also the associated metadata.
Video surveillance application scenario
In our particular example scenario, illustrated in Figure 2 , video surveillance is used as the primary means of a deterrent measure against unauthorized access to, for example, a car manufacturing plant. In addition to the video-surveillance system operated by numerous strategically positioned cameras continuously monitoring both inside and outside of the plant, the surveillance relies on a team of security guards with mobile monitoring devices (that is, dedicated PDAs), and a control room, in which the collected data is processed, compressed, and stored in the highest possible resolution, bit/frame rate, and quality for further use if needed. The guards are expected to OctoberDecember 2011
have varying levels of access to different parts of the manufacturing plant, as the premises of the research and development and marketing strategy departments might be protected at a higher level than other parts of the site, which house the administrative offices, canteen areas, and so on. In this way, while some senior guards can access video content from a number of positions, the junior guards are only able to receive content related to their permitted areas. This application scenario is particularly significant, as it involves the coexistence of both real-time and stored compressed video content acquired through the surveillance cameras. The video feeds are encrypted to avoid unauthorized access to the captured content, protecting not only the content itself but also the metadata. Authentication is important as it ensures the content's integrity via means of protection, while providing the necessary proof that an authentic source has generated the content. Relevant licenses are used while accessing the surveillance content, as they help to associate different qualities and levels of access to the same content among the users. Privacy features are needed, as different regions of the surveillance content can be protected in a different way to protect the privacy of captured particular subjects in a scene by, for instance, scrambling faces.
In this scenario, a two-level encryption scheme is considered. Each piece of content is encrypted using a random encryption key (for example, key x 1 in Figure 2) , and in the same way, metadata is encrypted using another random key (for example, key x 2 in Figure 2 ). These random keys are in turn encrypted with whichever keys afford access to particular pieces of data (for example, keys A x , B x , or C in Figure 2 ). For example, A x could be used to encrypt x 2 , and B x to encrypt x 1 and x 2 . In this way, A x would only be supplied to entities allowed to access the metadata, but not the content, such as untrusted adaptation engines; and B x would only be supplied to trusted adaptation engines and authorized users.
It's equally important that we can adapt the surveillance-video content, because both mobile security-team guards and members of the fixed control-unit staff might wish to access the same content with varying terminal features and access network technologies as well as under diverse usage environments. All of these requirements necessitate a set of tools for adapting secured surveillance content (such as summarizing stored video or transrating, cropping, and focusing into an area of attention) in such a complex and heterogeneous, yet governed, multimedia application scenario.
Next, we provide further descriptions of two specific use cases.
Use case 1: guards receive surveillance content on PDAs
The first use case in the video-surveillanceapplication scenario focuses on patrolling security guards on site (both inside and outside of the buildings). The guards are equipped with PDAs, dedicated to receive both online (live) and offline (recorded) compressed surveillance content through the existing wireless access medium, such as a WiMAX network. The content is captured through numerous surveillance cameras deployed across the site, and data from these cameras is collected by the main processing unit in the control facility, which is then compressed and distributed to the PDAs of the requesting guards based on their location.
In this use case, the authenticated surveillance content is secured through encryption with a random key (for example, key y 1 ) and similarly, the related metadata is encrypted with another random key (for example, key y 2 ). These keys are used to encrypt every piece of data; and the associated licenses restrict access to the secured content and the related metadata depending on the guards' location as well as their authorized access levels. The guards are expected to possess varying levels of access to different parts of the manufacturing plant; and this can be arranged using their staff membership identifiers. Therefore, we need for a number of encryption keys (that is, keys A y and B y ) and associating identifiers, which are related to the staff access levels. These keys are used to encrypt the content and metadata encryption keys (such as key y 1 and y 2 mentioned previously). The protection server stores the different encrypted versions of the random encryption. Every time a guard moves from one area to another, he or she is reauthorized to view any content, and the governance server supplies him or her with the necessary key(s), previously acquired from the protection server (for example, keys A y and B y ).
All of the keys referred to previously can be used with a fast and secure symmetric-encryption
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algorithm like the Advanced Encryption Standard. Current software implementations of this algorithm can cope with real-time encryption of video data at the bit rates that are usual for mobile devices. Depending on the security requirements, different key lengths can be used, for example, 128-bit for bulk-encryption keys (y 1 and y 2 ) and 192-bit for key-encryption keys (A y and B y ).
As the usage environment of the surveillance content primarily involves access through a mobile and wireless network by the end terminals, which have restricted capabilities and display sizes (such as with PDAs in this particular use case), it's necessary to provide a low-resolution and low bit-and frame-rate version of the original rich video. This is achievable through employing adaptation capabilities of the proposed architecture on the scalable video captured by the surveillance system. Furthermore, a minimum limit for the content resolution is guaranteed through the use of licenses for the guards that let them receive the necessary video quality to detect any incident. In this way, a preview quality video can be fed to the mobile guards unless further and more specific adaptation operations are authorized for a particular guard and terminal.
Typically, the architecture operation in this particular use case can be as follows: a mobile security guard logs into the surveillance system (via the supervision server) using his or her PDA and tries to access the content being recorded in a certain surveillance area. The intermediary detects that the captured and recorded video content occupies too much space because of its large size. Realizing that the user is requesting the content through his or her mobile terminal over a resource-limited wireless access network, the intermediary directly contacts the adaptation engine with a request to downscale the size of the requested video for a suitable viewing condition. While doing this, the intermediary supplies the adaptation engine with the relevant context (not encrypted) of the usage environment, such as the terminal display size, network conditions, security IDs, and so on (such as MPEG-21 DIA Usage Environment Descriptions).
At this stage, an authorization for such adaptation also needs to be obtained. The governance server supplies the adaptation engine with the necessary information on the permitted adaptations. If the adaptation engine is an untrusted one, it performs adaptation of the content without the need for decrypting itthe governance server will allow the adaptation, but will only attach the metadata decryption key (for example, key A y ) within the adaptation authorization response. Otherwise, for a trusted adaptation engine, the key associated to content and metadata (for example, key B y ) will be supplied by the governance server, as usual through the supervision server. During these operations, if the guard who has requested the surveillance content moves to an untrusted area, the context update associated with the new environment is supplied to the governance server, which then contacts the content server to interrupt the streaming of the secured surveillance video.
If the guard tries to continue accessing the protected content from the untrusted area or even from outside the system, a number of measures will prevent access. First, access is only permitted through a trusted client, which won't make the decryption keys available to external applications-that is, it won't be possible to extract and keep a local copy of the keys. Also, the authorization-based licenseenforcing mechanism provided by the governance server won't allow access to the protected content if the license conditions aren't met. Finally, the system's security policy might determine how often the encryption keys are changed-for example, every day or even every few minutes-to further hamper unauthorized access in case the trusted client was somehow bypassed. Figure 3 (next page) shows the relevant parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for this use case.
Use case 2: police access recorded content and zoom into areas of interest
In the second use case, the original content, which was captured and stored in the highest possible resolution, bit and frame rate, and quality, is accessed by top-level authorized users (the head of security or the police) to investigate a reported security breach. Thus, the highest-resolution content is encrypted with different random keys (for example, keys x 1a , x 1b , and so on) for each part of the content, each having a different access level. All of these content-encryption keys are encrypted with the master key (key C). To restrict access to specific parts of the secured content, keys
OctoberDecember 2011 x 1a , x 1b , and so on are also encrypted with other encryption keys, such as keys B xa (for x 1a ), B xb (for x 1a and x 1b ), and so on. Then, depending on his or her role and location, the appropriate decryption key (key B xa , key B xb , key C, and so on) will be delivered to the user. Moreover, associated content-related metadata information is encrypted using a random key (for example, key x 2 ), which is in turn encrypted with keys A i and B i (where i stands for x a , x b , and so on). Metadata is also stored and encrypted (as detailed in use case 1), and contains information related to time stamps, location, and camera angle identification of the captured video feed along with the necessary licenses for accessing the content.
As in use case 1, the keys will belong to a symmetric encryption algorithm such as the Advanced Encryption Standard. In this case, more sensitive data can be encrypted with stronger keys-for example, a 192-bit key can be used for high-resolution content, and a 256-bit key can be used as the master key (key C).
As we mentioned, licenses are required for associating different qualities and levels of access to the content, and hence also related to the metadata. Furthermore, the relevant metadata assists the authentication tasks to preserve content integrity, while also providing proof that an authentic source has generated the content. Event reporting information is also stored in a repository, and the supervision server provides functionalities to users for consulting the summaries of the reports.
If a brief operational workflow is drawn as per the description provided in first use case, it can be exemplified as follows: upon receiving an alert, a police officer logs into the surveillance system (via the supervision server) through a PC located in the control room and selects the option to view a specific portion of the content recorded by one of the surveillance cameras. 
IEEE MultiMedia
The governance server checks if the user has the appropriate permissions to view the requested video content, and because the user is a member of the police, the video is rendered. For this purpose, the governance server supplies the decryption key to the intermediary by requesting it from the protection server following the user's positive authorization. The user's terminal is either a PC monitor or a TV screen with high-resolution capabilities, as opposed to the low-resolution PDA terminals used by the mobile security guards in the first use case. The request from the police user includes not only the video content, but also the summary of the event reports related to the video and the metadata (time, place, and recording camera).
The police officer selects a specific region of a scene and tries to zoom into it, focusing on a suspicious-looking person in this scene to try and recognize the face. This request indicates the need for an adaptation operation on the stored high-resolution surveillance content. Thus, the governance server checks whether the user can perform this adaptation and, given that he or she has the appropriate permissions, the image is adapted and rendered. For performing this operation, the governance server supplies the decryption key to the adaptation engine, as the particular adaptation request requires further access into the low-level and possibly semantic and structural specifics of the compressed video content. Figure 4 shows the associated parameter exchanges between the modules of the proposed architecture for this use case.
Results and discussions
The governance server not only copes with traditional authorization, which accepts or denies a particular user access to particular content, but also deals with the governance of various types of adaptations by means of In use case 1, for example, when a junior guard located in a trusted area tries to access the surveillance content, an automatic adaptation request would be sent from the intermediary to the adaptation engine. Figure 5 shows the subsequent authorization request message sent by the adaptation engine to the governance server. The message specifies the membership ID, the resource ID, the right requested by the user, and the user location. As can be seen from this figure, this information is expressed based on the MPEG-21 REL and MPEG-7 descriptors to guarantee interoperability.
The same authorization request could also be used for use case 2. There would be several differences in this case. First, the principal would be a police officer (and thus, the user identifier would be different from that of Figure 5) . Next, the resource would be pieces of recorded content from several rooms (for example, urn:videosurveillance) or a specific region of interest of the recorded content from a particular room (for example, urn: videosurveillance:D6:room008:ROI10). Finally, the location would be the security control room instead of the one mentioned in Figure 5 , which would be a highly secure zone.
The governance server would then check the repository of licenses to identify the licenses associated with the required resource and principal, and subsequently determine whether to authorize the request by comparing the information of the authorization request message with the conditions specified in the license. As Figure 6 shows, the authorization response message includes an authorization response element (which is a Boolean expression), a list of the permitted adaptations and their corresponding constraints specified in the license, and the necessary key to decrypt the content and/or metadata encryption keys.
It's a remarkable fact that, to date, the MPEG-21 REL location element has merely allowed expressing a postal address. Hence, we believe that for the video-surveillance application scenario, it's essential that the conditions included in the licenses should express more meaningful and accurate locations, such as GPS coordinates or any other internally structured coordinates. Thus, we propose to extend the MPEG-21 REL location element with the MPEG-7 place element. We envision that this extension should be a part of a new MPEG-21 REL profile for video-surveillance applications.
Regarding the user-access authorization (as shown in Figure 4 ), the exchange of messages 
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would be the same. The intermediary would be responsible for guaranteeing that user access is performed respecting the adaptation constraints (which should be fulfilled whether the content is adapted or not), and, if necessary, for requesting the required adaptation operation from the adaptation engine.
In use case 1, the video content sent from the content server is downscaled by the adaptation engine. Because the video content has been encoded in a scalable format, this adaptation can be carried out by simply dropping parts of the content. Moreover, the video content is encrypted using the technology presented in other work, 12 which allows for adapting the encrypted content without decrypting it. As a result, it's possible to use an untrusted adaptation engine to perform this adaptation. In this case, the adaptation engine only needs access to the metadata for deciding the appropriate adaptation that satisfies the usage environment constraints, such as terminal capabilities and network conditions. The input to the adaptation process is an encrypted stream. The adaptation engine selects which fragments of this stream to send to the guard's terminal. The output is another stream, which is also encrypted, as no decryption is performed, and of a suitable size for the terminal to comfortably display (after being decrypted with the appropriate key). Table 1 summarizes the adaptation results. Figure 7 shows a visual comparison between the adapted and original sequences. Please note that a pedestrian high-definition test video sequence has been used for demonstration purposes. In use case 2, content is adapted upon a police officer's request to zoom into a specific video region, in this case to view a person's face with the highest possible detail. In this scenario, we can consider that one type of adaptation is already being performed, namely the downscaling of the video to match the display resolution. After requesting the zoom into the region of interest, downscaling is no longer appropriate, which means that the higher-quality layers must be decrypted by means of the appropriate key. Instead, a new adaptation is applied: the cropping of the region of interest.
As with the previous use case, if this adaptation can be performed by dropping parts of the video stream, it's still possible to use an untrusted adaptation engine. In this case, the encoding of the original video content should be performed in a manner compatible with the needs of this type of adaptation (such as enabling the interactive region-of-interest feature in the encoding stage). Furthermore, the pertinent metadata should be available to the untrusted adaptation engine. Nevertheless, the adaptation is performed by a trusted adaptation engine in our experiments, as the original video stream doesn't support the aforementioned feature. Therefore, the keys for decoding both the IEEE MultiMedia metadata as well as video data are received by the adaptation engine. As in the previous case, the adaptation engine uses the usage environment constraints to determine the properties of the adapted video, such as cropping window definition, output resolution, and bit rate. Subsequently, the content is transcoded accordingly. Table 2 summarizes the adaptation results.
In Figure 8a , assuming that the circled person standing in front of the shop represents the region of interest, we see a snapshot of the adapted content. Moreover, Figure 8b shows a snapshot of the video stream adapted using an alternative adaptation approach, which is the adaptation performed in use case 1.
Conclusions and future work
Our proposed architecture for the secure adaptation and distribution of digital content in governed multimedia applications is a modular architecture, enabling the adaptation of any kind of secured content to enhance users' perceived quality in heterogeneous usage environments. The proposed functional architecture can be used to manage protected content in a wide variety of applications, ranging from collaborative scenarios to security applications; from infotainment and e-services to numerous professional consumer applications. This article has focused on video surveillance applications, because these applications are present in our everyday lives, and they pose a challenge for addressing privacy protection and the secure management of digital content in heterogeneous usage environments.
Further work in this area might consider a variation of the second use case, where most of the video is encrypted with one key, yet some sensitive parts are encrypted with a different and more restrictive key, for which a special license is required. For example, to protect user privacy, the faces of persons appearing in the video can be scrambled with a higherlevel key, while the rest of the scene is scrambled with a lower-level key. Consequently, the guards would then have access to the latter part of the overall video, and would be able to view the protected content except for the faces in the image. The authorized police officers only would be able to use the higher-level key to zoom into a specific region of interest. MM OctoberDecember 2011
